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1 
A “THICKET OF PROCEDURAL BRAMBLES:”1  
THE “ORDER OF BATTLE” IN QUALIFIED IMMUNITY AND HABEAS 
CORPUS† 
 
LAURA S. ARONSSON* 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This Note is confined to qualified immunity and habeas corpus sequencing 
jurisprudence.  Scholars have debated these “order of battle” issues, arguing for a 
mandatory constitutional merits analysis in every qualified immunity or habeas 
corpus claim, while others have written articles that support the current 
approaches with certain carved-out exceptions.  A few scholars have discussed 
qualified immunity and habeas corpus together, along with other doctrines, to 
demonstrate alleged recent judicial activist tendencies.  Others have discussed the 
doctrines together in the context of civil rights, arguing that the qualified immunity 
expansion and the introduction of the AEDPA standard has led to legal stagnation, 
and, as a result, diminished civil rights.  This Note is the first to analyze the two 
doctrines together in order to argue that the Supreme Court’s current approach, a 
case-by-case analysis, responds to inherent tensions within our dual system of 
government and provides the best compromise.  In coming to this conclusion, this 
Note discusses the evolution of the two doctrines, while considering problems of 
federalism, separation of powers, dicta, judicial economy, and fairness.  Finally, it 
analyzes various scholars’ suggestions, reactions, and criticisms to alternative 
approaches the Supreme Court could impose. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Qualified immunity and habeas corpus play important roles in the American 
system of government as they serve as gatekeepers for constitutional claims against 
state and federal officials.  Both doctrines stem from a tension within government.  
In qualified immunity, the tension lies between the executive and the judicial 
branch, and, in the context of habeas corpus, between state and federal sovereigns.  
The doctrines require courts to compare the plaintiff’s or habeas petitioner’s 
particular set of facts to precedent and to determine whether there exists a “clearly 
 
 1.  In re Troy Anthony Davis, 565 F.3d 810, 827 (11th Cir. 2009) (Barkett, J., dissenting). 
†   Winner of the first annual Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy’s writing 
competition’s online prize.  
*    B.A., Yale University, 2008; J.D. Notre Dame Law School, 2014.  Thank you to the editors of the 
Notre Dame Journal of Law Ethics & Public Policy and the editors of Notre Dame Law Review for your 
comments and editing.  Additionally, a special thank you to AJB and to PWH for your guidance in this topic.   
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established” law or constitutional right that has been violated.  Scholars have delved 
into each test individually, by analyzing the application of the tests,2 effects on 
constitutional rights,3 efficiencies and inefficiencies,4 and workability.5  This Note 
is confined to the parallels between the qualified immunity and habeas corpus 
frameworks. 
The qualified immunity doctrine serves as a defense to claims against state and 
federal officials who are alleged to have violated constitutional rights.  The doctrine 
balances “the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power 
irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and 
liability when they perform their duties reasonably.”6  The doctrine aims not only to 
protect constitutional rights, but also to provide fair notice to officials,7 to be cost 
efficient,8 and to prevent overdeterrence.9  An adequate balance among these 
competing concerns should “provide government officials with the ability 
‘reasonably [to] anticipate when their conduct may give rise to liability for 
damages.’”10  The Supreme Court has altered this balance over time by articulating 
 
 2.  See Daniel J. McGrady, Comment, Whose Line Is It Anyway?: A Retrospective Study of the Supreme 
Court's Split Analysis of § 2254(d)(1) Since 2000, 41 SETON HALL L. REV 1599 (2011) (arguing that many of 
the significant habeas decisions in the past decade have been “arbitrary” because the “conservative” and 
“liberal” Justices have applied the habeas standard differently, resulting in many five to four decisions). 
 3.  See Lynn Adelman & Jon Deitrich, Saying What the Law Is: How Certain Legal Doctrines Impede 
the Development of Constitutional Law and What Courts Can Do About It, 2 FED. CTS. L. REV. 87, 93 (2007) 
(arguing that the Supreme Court’s current doctrine that allows lower courts to avoid constitutional questions 
when deciding qualified immunity issues reduces the “content of our constitutional rights . . . to the lowest 
common denominator.”). 
 4.  In the qualified immunity context, Professor Chen argues that the standard created a paradoxical 
effect in that the qualified immunity standard was created to ease the costs of these types of litigation, but 
instead the doctrine has created a messy and expensive system of resolving these cases.  See Alan K. Chen, 
The Burdens of Qualified Immunity: Summary Judgment and the Role of Facts in Constitutional Tort Law, 47 
AM. U. L. REV. 1, 6–7 (1997).  In the habeas context, see Thomas Healy, The Rise of Unnecessary 
Constitutional Rulings, 83 N.C. L. REV. 847 (2005) (examining the Court’s broader embrace of unnecessary 
constitutional rulings in the context of applying the qualified immunity test) and Melissa M. Berry, Seeking 
Clarity in the Federal Habeas Fog: Defining What Constitutes “Clearly Established” Law Under the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 747 (2005) (providing an overview of the 
Court’s application of the AEDPA standard and what constitutes “clearly established”).  
 5.  See Allan Ides, Habeas Standards of Review Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1): A Commentary on 
Statutory Text and Supreme Court Precedent, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV 677, 680 (2003) (discussing the 
development of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), finding that the cases have left us “with a mix of light and fog,” and 
attempting to articulate a “workable way of applying [the statute] in a fashion that comports with text and 
precedent”). 
 6.  Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009).  
 7.  Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975) (holding that officials “must be held to a standard of 
conduct based . . . on knowledge of the basic, unquestioned constitutional rights of his charges.  Such a 
standard imposes neither an unfair burden upon a person assuming a responsible public office requiring a high 
degree of intelligence and judgment for the proper fulfillment of its duties, nor an unwarranted burden in light 
of the value which civil rights have in our legal system.  Any lesser standard would deny much of the promise 
of § 1983.”). 
 8.  Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001) (“[A] ruling on [the qualified immunity issue] should be 
made early in the proceedings so that the costs and expenses of trial are avoided where the defense is 
dispositive.”). 
 9.  Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982) (“[T]here is the danger that fear of being sued will 
‘dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible [public officials], in the unflinching 
discharge of their duties.’”) (citing Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949)). 
 10.  Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646 (1987) (quoting Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 195 
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and revising the standards for the defense, but the most recent standard focuses on 
the clarity of the state of the relevant constitutional right at the time of the officer’s 
actions.  Pearson v. Callahan11 articulated a two-part test to determine whether 
qualified immunity is appropriate.  Lower courts must ask “whether the facts that a 
plaintiff has alleged or shown make out a violation of a constitutional right” and 
“whether the right at issue was ‘clearly established’ at the time of defendant’s 
alleged misconduct.”12  If so, the official is not entitled to qualified immunity.13  
The Court, however, provided lower courts with discretion in determining the order 
of application of these two prongs.14 
The habeas corpus doctrine has similarly developed from a tension between 
competing interests.  Whether a petitioner is entitled to habeas relief—federal court 
review of a state court criminal conviction—is subject to the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act15 (“AEDPA”).  AEDPA served “to reduce delays in 
the execution of state and federal criminal sentences, particularly in capital 
cases.”16  The statute does this by preventing “retrials” and “giv[ing] effect to state 
convictions to the extent possible under law,” while advancing “the principles of 
comity, finality, and federalism.”17  This habeas standard, rooted in Supreme Court 
decisions, evolved from strict scrutiny18 to be more deferential to state courts, and, 
finally to the current standard under AEDPA, which imposes a significant hurdle 
for habeas petitioners to overcome.  Federal courts are authorized to grant a writ of 
habeas corpus only if the state court decision “involved an unreasonable 
application[] of clearly established Federal law.”19  Under this standard, federal 
courts are permitted—but are not required—to determine whether the state court 
erred. 
To balance effectively concerns that are fundamental to our judicial system, 
like fairness on the one hand, and efficiency and deference on the other, the 
qualified immunity and habeas standards must be sufficiently clear to lower courts 
to maintain uniformity, but must also provide flexibility in novel situations.  The 
doctrines provide discretion to lower courts to determine their methodology: with 
qualified immunity, courts can determine the constitutional issue on the merits, 
despite the fact that immunity applies or courts can dismiss the case because the 
right was not clearly established enough at the time.20  With habeas, courts can 
decide whether the state court erred or courts can dismiss the case because the state 
 
(1984)); see also Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819 (“The public interest in deterrence of unlawful conduct and in 
compensation of victims remains protected by a test that focuses on the objective legal reasonableness of an 
official’s acts.”). 
 11.  555 U.S. 223 (2009).  
 12.  Id. at 232. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2012). 
 16.  Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 206 (2003). 
 17.  Id.  For a background and overview of the history of the habeas doctrine, see 2 RANDY HERTZ & 
JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 32.1 (5th ed. 2005). 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2012).   
 20.  See supra notes 11–14 and accompanying text. 
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court’s rationale did not constitute an unreasonable application of Supreme Court 
law.21  This Note will consider this “order of battle” issue raised by each of the 
frameworks and will justify the current Supreme Court’s case-by-case approaches 
by arguing that, while the tests permit a broad discretion in determining the order of 
application of the prongs, this discretionary approach is necessary within a 
government of separate powers and dual sovereignty.  A flexible approach to these 
doctrines adheres to both doctrines’ purposes of avoiding litigation and promoting 
finality, while permitting courts to rule on constitutional issues when appropriate. 
 
I. RELEVANT STATUTORY LAW 
 
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiffs can sue state officials in their private 
capacity for monetary damages resulting from constitutional violations.22  To 
prevail on a claim, a plaintiff must prove “(1) that [he or she had been] deprived of 
a constitutional or federal statutory right and (2) that the person who deprived [him 
or her] of that right was acting under the color of state law.”23  Under Bivens,24 
plaintiffs can also bring these types of actions against federal officials.25  Claims 
against state and federal officials, such as police officers, parole officers, social 
workers, schoolteachers, and governors,26 can include “illegal searches and 
seizures, retaliatory discharges, cruel and unusual treatment of prisoners, and 
deprivations of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.”27  Courts 
navigate and define the scope of these substantive rights through balancing tests 
rather than bright line rules.28  In deciding cases on the merits, courts weigh 
individual rights against the corresponding governmental interest.  The qualified 
immunity standard comes into play at the summary judgment stage, before courts 
decide the merits of the constitutional issue. 
Under § 2254(d) of AEDPA, a federal court can grant the writ of habeas corpus 
only under certain circumstances.29  The adjudication of the claim must have either: 
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in 
a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts 
 
 21.  See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 22.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). 
 23.  Gomez v. Toledo, 446 US 635, 640 (1980). 
 24.  Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971). 
 25.  Id. (holding that a constitutional violation “by a federal agent acting under color of his authority 
gives rise to a cause of action for damages consequent upon his [] conduct”). 
 26.  Barbara E. Armacost, Qualified Immunity: Ignorance Excused, 51 VAND. L. REV. 583, 618 (1998). 
 27.  Id. at 617–18. 
 28.  For examples of constitutional balancing tests, see Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 
602, 619 (1989) (“Thus, the permissibility of a particular practice ‘is judged by balancing its intrusion on the 
individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests.’”); 
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 347 (1976) (applying the balancing test in the context of procedural due 
process). 
 29.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2012). 
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in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.30 
This Note is confined to the way in which courts have applied the clearly 
established inquiry. 
 
II. BACKGROUND 
 
A. Qualified Immunity 
 
The Supreme Court established the qualified immunity doctrine when it 
interpreted § 198331 to incorporate all common law immunities.32  The Court first 
acknowledged the doctrine as a defense to constitutional violation damages claims 
in Pierson v. Ray,33 when the Court recognized the common law defense of good 
faith.34  Since Ray, the Supreme Court’s qualified immunity test has shifted from a 
subjective inquiry to an objective inquiry, but it still relies on the same key 
principles. 
In Scheuer v. Rhodes,35 the Court determined what type of immunity state 
officials enjoy.36  The Court held that, unlike judges and legislators, officers enjoy 
immunity only when they are acting in good faith and informed by reasonable 
belief.37  This good faith inquiry required a case-by-case analysis of the officer’s 
actions and included both objective and subjective elements.38  Under this 
precedent, if an official truly thought he was acting within the bounds of the law 
and he had a reasonable belief, he would be immune from suit.  Likewise, in Wood 
v. Strickland,39 the Court held that if the official “knew or reasonably should have 
known that the action [he] took . . . would violate [] constitutional rights . . . or if 
[he] took the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of 
[constitutional] rights or other injury,” that official could not rely on the doctrine.40  
The Court declared that officials should know of “clearly established constitutional 
rights.”41 
Harlow v. Fitzgerald42 expanded the qualified immunity defense by eliminating 
the “malicious intention” introduced in Scheuer and Wood.43  The Supreme Court 
 
 30.  Ides, supra note 5, at 681 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254) (emphasis added). 
 31.  42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).  This provision was enacted as part of the Ku Klux Klan Act.  Pub. L. No. 
42–22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871).   
 32.  Diana Hassel, Living a Lie: The Cost of Qualified Immunity, 64 MO. L. REV. 123, 125–26 (1999).   
 33.  386 U.S. 547 (1967) (recognizing a Fourth Amendment claim brought by black ministers against 
police officers who arrested them for using segregated facilities). 
 34.  Id. at 557. 
 35.  416 U.S. 232 (1974). 
 36.  Id. at 240–42. 
 37.  Id. at 247–48. 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  420 U.S. 308 (1975). 
 40.  Id. at 322 (emphasis added).   
 41.  Id. 
 42.  457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982). 
 43.  Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815–17 (1982) (“The subjective element of the good-faith 
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eliminated the subjective component of the test and outlined qualified immunity in 
objective terms.44  The Court stated that immunity is not appropriate “if an official 
knew or reasonably should have known” that his action “would violate the 
constitutional rights of the [plaintiff].”45  This change characterized the qualified 
immunity analysis as a question of law.  The Court emphasized the social and 
economic costs of the good faith prong of the defense46 and this change would 
avoid raising jury questions that could often preclude summary judgment and 
sidestep the doctrine’s primary goal of avoiding unnecessary litigation.  In stark 
contrast to earlier cases in which the Court had focused on fairness and 
overdeterrence issues, the Harlow majority shifted to an efficiency-based approach.  
In his concurrence, Justice Brennan added that immunity should not be “available 
whenever the plaintiff cannot prove, as a threshold matter, that a violation of his 
constitutional rights actually occurred.”47 
In Siegert v. Gilley,48 the Court further clarified Harlow’s objective test by 
holding that the defendant must have violated a constitutional right.49  In that case, 
plaintiff sued his former employer alleging that his supervisor had defamed him 
with the supervisor’s negative response to a reference request.50  In applying 
Harlow, the Court found that even if the allegations were accepted as true, the 
plaintiff did not state a claim for a violation of any constitutional right,51 therefore 
the claim failed at an “analytically earlier stage of the inquiry.”52  Chief Justice 
Rehnquist declared that whether a right was violated is often a “necessary 
concomitant” to the “purely legal question” of whether the right is clearly 
established.53  Seven years later, in County of Sacramento v. Lewis,54 Justice Souter 
wrote: “the better approach . . . is to determine first whether the plaintiff has alleged 
a deprivation of a constitutional right at all.  Normally it is only then that a court 
would ask whether the right allegedly implicated was clearly established at the time 
of the events in question.”55  This approach ensured that contours of official 
conduct remained certain, benefitting both plaintiffs and defendants.  Deciding the 
constitutional issue “promotes clarity in the legal standards for official conduct, to 
the benefit of both the officers and the general public.”56  In the wake of Lewis, 
 
defense frequently has proved incompatible with our admonition in Butz that insubstantial claims should not 
proceed to trial . . . . [B]are allegations of malice should not suffice to subject government officials either to 
the costs of trial or to the burdens of broad-reaching discovery.”). 
 44.  Id. at 807 (citing Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507–08 (1978)).  “In the context of Butz’ 
attempted balancing of competing values, it now is clear that substantial costs attend the litigation of the 
subjective good faith of government officials.”  Id. at 816. (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis omitted). 
 45.  Id. at 814. 
 46.  Id. at 807. 
 47.  Id. at 821 (Brennan, J., concurring).   
 48.  500 U.S. 226 (1991). 
 49.  Id. at 228. 
 50.  Id.  
 51.  Id. at 227, 231. 
 52.  Id. at 227. 
 53.  Id. at 232. 
 54.  523 U.S. 833 (1998). 
 55.  Id. at 841 n.5 (emphasis added). 
 56.  Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999). 
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lower courts were unsure of how to interpret the Supreme Court’s seemingly 
suggestive sequencing jurisprudence, resulting in different methodologies among 
circuits.57 
In 2001, the Supreme Court addressed the sequencing of the qualified 
immunity test by unanimously announcing a strict two-prong approach in Saucier v. 
Katz.58  Under this precedent, the proper approach is first to ask whether, “[t]aken 
in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury . . . the facts alleged 
show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right?”59  If not, the inquiry 
ends and the case should be dismissed.60  If the facts alleged do show a violation of 
a constitutional right, however, the second step is to consider whether the right was 
clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.61  By mandating lower courts 
to ask first whether the facts show that the officer’s conduct violated a 
constitutional right, the test required lower courts to resolve difficult constitutional 
issues before even addressing the immunity question. 
In 2009, the Court reexamined Saucier’s two-step test in Pearson v. 
Callahan.62  There, the Court “held that federal courts are no longer required to 
decide the merits of constitutional claims before determining whether a defendant is 
entitled to qualified immunity.”63  The case involved a § 1983 complaint against 
police officers who were alleged to have executed a warrantless search on the 
plaintiff’s home that led to a conviction for the sale of methamphetamine.64  The 
district court found the search to be illegal, but granted summary judgment to the 
officers on qualified immunity grounds because the officers could have reasonably 
believed that the “consent-once-removed” doctrine validated the search.65  The 
Court granted certiorari and, additionally, requested that the parties brief the 
mandatory Saucier procedure.66  In articulating the test, the Court held that lower 
courts must determine “whether the facts that a plaintiff has alleged or shown make 
out a violation of a constitutional right” and “whether the right at issue was ‘clearly 
established’ at the time of defendant’s alleged misconduct.”67  The Court, however, 
provided lower courts with discretion in determining the order of application of the 
two prongs because lower courts “are in the best position to determine the order of 
decisionmaking that will best facilitate the fair and efficient disposition of each 
 
 57.  See Pearson v. Ramos, 237 F.3d 881, 883 (7th Cir. 2001) (“Whether [the sequencing approach] is 
absolute may be doubted.”); Horne v. Coughlin, 191 F.3d 244, 245–56 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting that “if courts 
always avoided the constitutional issue by repeatedly dismissing suits on the basis of the defendants’ 
immunity, standards of official conduct would tend to remain uncertain, to the detriment both of officials and 
individuals”) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Country of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n.5 
(1998). 
 58.  533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).  
 59.  Id. (citing Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991)).  
 60.  Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. 
 61.  Id.  
 62.  555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009). 
 63.  Jack M. Beermann, Qualified Immunity and Constitutional Avoidance, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 139, 140 
(2009).  
 64.  Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 227 (2009).  
 65.  Id. at 229. 
 66.  Beermann, supra note 63, at 140. 
 67.  Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232. 
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case.”68  Since Pearson, the Court has decided several qualified immunity cases 
using both the Saucier approach and the discretion afforded to them in the Pearson 
analysis without clarifying its selection of one approach over the other.69 
The discretion the Supreme Court afforded lower courts in Pearson has led to 
debates among scholars.  Some scholars argue that the Supreme Court has not given 
lower courts a sufficient framework for applying the test, nor sufficient guidance on 
when to rule on the merits of a constitutional issue.  For example, Professor 
Beermann argues that Pearson’s new methodology is “deeply problematic” as a 
standardless, unreviewable discretion70 and argues that guidelines should replace 
the mandatory two-step approach.  He also contends that there should be a 
presumption in favor of deciding cases on the merits.71 
Other scholars argue that any ruling on the constitutional merits in a case in 
which qualified immunity is appropriate constitutes dicta, is not permitted by the 
Constitution, and results in an unnecessary expenditure of judicial resources.  This 
dicta issue begs the question of whether prevailing officials are permitted to appeal 
the district court’s ruling on the constitutional issue when they have been granted 
qualified immunity.  This scenario arose in Camreta v. Greene,72 when the winning 
defendant petitioned for certiorari of the circuit court’s finding of a constitutional 
violation, even though the officer had been granted qualified immunity.  The 
Supreme Court carved out an exception when it recognized an “exempt[ion for] one 
special category of cases from our usual rule against considering prevailing parties’ 
petitions.”73  In regards to the case or controversy requirement, the Court 
determined that the officials possessed a sufficient Article III interest in the 
resolution of the issue because they encountered these types of Fourth Amendment 
issues on a regular basis.74  In carving out an exception, the Court stated, “We think 
just such a reason places qualified immunity cases in a special category when it 
comes to this Court’s review of appeals brought by winners”75 because these types 
of rulings would “have a significant future effect on the conduct of public officials 
and the policies of the government units to which they belong.”76 
Justice Kennedy’s dissent opposed this carved-out exception to the Article III 
prohibition against petitions by prevailing parties and argued the plaintiff had had 
no Article III interest in obtaining this declaratory judgment.77  He contended that 
the majority “overr[ode] jurisdictional rules that are basic to the functioning of the 
 
 68.  Id. at 241–42.  
 69.  See Safford Unified School District No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 377–78 (2009). 
 70.  Beermann, supra note 63. 
 71.  Beermann argues that “[a]t a minimum, courts should be required to give reasons for not doing so.”  
Id. at 161. 
 72.  131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011). 
 73.  Id. at 2033. 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  Id. at 2030 (emphasis added). 
 76.  Id. at 2031.  Ultimately, however, the Court held that this particular case was moot because 
respondent was almost eighteen years old and had moved away from the Ninth Circuit’s jurisdiction, so the 
exact situation could not technically arise again.  Id. at 2033. 
 77.  Id. at 2041 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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Court and to the necessity of avoiding advisory opinions.”78 
The history of the qualified immunity test and the move from a subjective to an 
objective approach, illustrates the careful balance the Supreme Court has struck 
between judicial economy, fairness, and deterrence.  The most recent standard, 
outlined in Pearson, sets forth a two-part test in which lower courts must determine 
whether the facts alleged show a constitutional violation and whether that right was 
clearly established.79  The Court provided lower courts with discretion in 
determining the order of application of these two prongs80 leading to scholarly 
debates regarding uniformity, judicial overreaching, and stagnation. 
 
B. Habeas Corpus 
 
The habeas standard is codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), but, like the qualified 
immunity standard, it has roots in caselaw.  In an early habeas case, Teague v. 
Lane,81 the Court held that, with two exceptions, habeas is not available to a 
petitioner who relied on a “new rule” of law.82  In that case, a black petitioner 
appealed the judgment of a state court jury convicting him of attempted murder.83  
The prosecutor had used all of his peremptory challenges to exclude blacks from 
the jury and the petitioner argued that those challenges denied him a jury that was a 
fair cross-section of the community.84  After considering the constitutional claim in 
light of past precedent, the Court defined a “new rule” as one that “breaks new 
ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government” or 
one that was “not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s 
conviction became final.”85  Two exceptions to this general rule provide that 
petitioner can rely on a new rule if that rule places the “proscription of certain kinds 
of primary, private conduct beyond the power of the government” or if that new 
rule is “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”86  Six years after Teague, 
Congress enacted AEDPA.  Section 2254(d)(1) imposes a limitation on federal 
court review of a state court decision, allowing review only if the adjudication of 
the decision at the state level “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or 
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.”87 
The Court first interpreted AEDPA’s language in Williams v. Taylor.88  The 
plurality opinion described the text of the Act as the “functional equivalent” of the 
 
 78.  Id. at 2037.  
 79.  Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009).  
 80.  Id. 
 81.  489 U.S. 288 (1989). 
 82.  Id. at 292–93. 
 83.  Id.  
 84.  Id. at 293. 
 85.  Id. at 301. 
 86.  Id. at 307 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). 
 87.  Ides, supra note 5, at 681 (emphasis added) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2001)). 
 88.  529 U.S. 362 (2000). 
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“new rule” principle adopted earlier in Teague.89  Under Williams, rules articulated 
by lower courts are still considered “new” for habeas purposes,90 but a rule dictated 
by the Supreme Court in its holdings, rather than in dicta,91 is an “old rule” that is 
clearly established within the bounds of the Act.  Relevant law “may be sufficiently 
clear for habeas purposes even when [it is] expressed in terms of a generalized 
standard rather than as a bright-line rule.”92  Unless the claim at issue “breaks new 
ground or imposes a new obligation,” it will be sufficiently clearly established.93  
The Court also found “that an unreasonable application of federal law is different 
from an incorrect application . . . .”94  The writ cannot be issued “simply” because 
the federal court finds “the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established 
federal law erroneously or incorrectly.  Rather, that application must also be 
unreasonable.”95 
Lower courts interpreted Williams in different ways because the Court failed to 
offer guidance on the sequence in which federal courts are supposed to decide 
whether the state court erred in its application of federal law and whether the 
decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of that law.  In Lockyer v. 
Andrade,96 the Court revisited the habeas standard when the petitioner claimed that 
California’s three-strike law violated his Eighth Amendment right against cruel and 
unusual punishment.97  The Ninth Circuit had required federal habeas courts to 
review the state court decision de novo before applying the AEDPA standard of 
review.98  The Supreme Court disagreed with this approach, stating that “AEDPA 
does not require a federal habeas court to adopt any one methodology in deciding 
the only question that matters under § 2254(d)(1)—whether a state court decision is 
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal 
law.”99  The Supreme Court confined its analysis to whether AEDPA foreclosed 
habeas relief on petitioner’s Eighth Amendment claim and did not reach the 
question of whether the state court erred. 
 
 89.  489 U.S. 288 (1989) (plurality opinion).  See also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 380 (2000) (“It 
is perfectly clear that AEDPA codifies Teague to the extent that Teague requires federal habeas courts to deny 
relief that is contingent upon a rule of law not clearly established at the time the state conviction became 
final.”).  This standard was affirmed in Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782 (2001). 
 90.  Critics argue that because so few cases reach the Supreme Court, this will have a stagnating effect on 
constitutional criminal procedure.  See Susan Bandes, Taking Justice to Its Logical Extreme: A Comment on 
Teague v. Lane, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2453 (1993). 
 91.  Williams, 529 U.S. at 412.  The holding is not constrained to bright-line rules and narrow statements, 
but consists of “the governing legal principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state 
court renders its decision.”  Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71–72 (2003) (citations omitted). 
 92.  Williams, 529 U.S. at 382. 
 93.  Id. at 381 (citations omitted) (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 301). 
 94.  Id. at 410 (emphasis in original). 
 95.  Id. at 411.  Under AEDPA, federal courts are authorized to grant a writ of habeas corpus only if the 
state court decision “involved an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law.”  28 U.S.C. § 
2254(d)(1) (2012).  Even if the federal court believes the state court applied the relevant federal law 
incorrectly, the federal courts must deny the petition so long as the decision was objectively reasonable.  See 
Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 68 (2003). 
 96.  538 U.S. 63 (2003). 
 97.  Id. at 68. 
 98.  Id. at 71. 
 99.  Id. (citing Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225 (2000)) (emphasis added). 
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Lockyer makes clear that courts have discretion to decide whether the state 
court erred, but must always decide whether the decision constituted an 
unreasonable application of Supreme Court law.  In Carey v. Musladin,100 the 
circuit court had granted habeas relief because it found that the criminal defendant 
had been denied a fair trial after the victim’s family arrived at court wearing buttons 
with the victim’s picture.101  The Supreme Court reversed, noting that although the 
Court had ruled on certain courtroom practices in the past pertaining to state actors, 
it had not ruled on the conduct of private persons in the courtroom.102  Lower courts 
had split on the constitutionality of this type of conduct,103 so the state court’s 
determination could not constitute an unreasonable application of federal law.104  
Notably, although the Court reversed, it did not rule on the merits of the 
constitutional issue of private persons in the courtroom.105 
As this sample of cases suggests, issues such as judicial economy, fairness 
concerns, and the potential for advisory opinions arise when courts must decide the 
order in which they will address the inquiries within the habeas corpus test.  Judges 
have disagreed not only on the application of the AEDPA standard and what 
constitutes an unreasonable application of federal law, but also on the federal courts 
role in habeas review. 
 
III. “ORDER OF BATTLE”106 
 
The sequencing issues that the habeas corpus and qualified immunity analyses 
raise create an enormous tension within the structure of the government.  The 
“order of battle” has been extensively debated with respect to both doctrines, but 
the structural principles that the two doctrines evoke have not yet been compared to 
one another.  As discussed in Part II.A, in the qualified immunity context, the 
Supreme Court in Pearson gave lower courts discretion to determine whether it is 
appropriate to analyze constitutional issues, rather than requiring the constitutional 
inquiry as a first step as in Saucier.107  Likewise, in the habeas context, in Lockyer, 
the Court recognized that lower courts are permitted to approach the analysis in the 
 
 100.  549 U.S. 70 (2006). 
 101.  Id. at 72. 
 102.  Id. at 70. 
 103.  Id. at 71. 
 104.  Id. 
 105.  For another recent example in which a court declined to address whether the petitioner’s 
constitutional rights were violated, see Jackson v. Litscher, 194 F. Supp. 2d 849, 865 (2002).  In this case, the 
Seventh Circuit declined to address whether an officer’s misleading statements in an attempt to induce a 
Miranda waiver violated the Fifth Amendment, and considered only whether the state court decision was 
“contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law.”  Id.  (citation 
omitted). 
 106.  In the qualified immunity context, scholars have termed this issue the “order of battle” dilemma.  See 
James E. Pfander, Essay, Resolving the Qualified Immunity Dilemma: Constitutional Tort Claims for Nominal 
Damages, 111 COLUM. L REV. 1602, 1607 (2011).  See also Nancy Leong, The Saucier Qualified Immunity 
Experiment: An Empirical Analysis, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 667, 668 (2009) (“Pearson’s holding has, if anything, 
intensified the debate over the proper procedural framework for addressing qualified immunity claims.”). 
 107.  Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 241–42 (2009).  
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best way they see fit.108  In both Pearson and Lockyer, the Court discouraged lower 
courts from unnecessarily exercising their power either to reanalyze the state court 
issue in habeas or to rule on the constitutional issue in qualified immunity.  In other 
ways, however, the Court expanded lower courts’ discretionary power to dismiss 
cases without having to address the constitutional issue.  The application of the 
tests, specifically the ordering, can change the outcome of not only the case at hand, 
but can also have significant future implications on future cases and on the 
development of constitutional law as a whole. 
In the qualified immunity context, while there may be some overlap in deciding 
whether a right exists and whether the right was clearly established at the time of 
the action, the two issues are articulated as distinct questions.  And their analyses 
are different.  In deciding whether the officer violated a plaintiff’s constitutional 
right, courts must look to caselaw and to modes of constitutional interpretation, 
whereas in analyzing the “clearly established” prong, a “purely legal analysis,” 
courts are confined to caselaw.109  In the habeas analysis, federal courts consider 
whether Supreme Court precedent has created clearly established law and whether 
the state court decision was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of that 
precedent. 
The sequencing decision in both cases is a judgment call, which allows courts 
to tailor the approach to the case at hand.  Like many other areas of constitutional 
law, these decisions involve balancing one competing interest against the other.110  
Relevant policy concerns include the need to develop constitutional law versus 
efficiency and fairness issues.  In deciding which approach to take in qualified 
immunity, many factors come into play.  Courts should be hesitant to dismiss an 
issue on the clearly established prong without deciding the merits before 
considering the potential impact on future plaintiffs of a ruling on the constitutional 
issue, petitioners’ incentives to litigate the constitutional issue, and how the set of 
facts fits on the spectrum of clearly established rights.  With habeas, by contrast, 
courts have in front of them a fully developed record, one that has been reviewed 
several times, and should hesitate before deciding whether a lower court erred.  
This Part considers scholarly and judge-made arguments against the current 
approach and argues that the discretionary methodology in the qualified immunity 
and habeas corpus doctrines is optimal.  This case-by-case discretion is necessary to 
a government of dual sovereignty and of separate powers because it provides 
federal courts with the option to stay their hand and dismiss a case or petition or to 
analyze the issue on the merits if the circumstances are appropriate. 
 
 
 108.  Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71 (2003). 
 109.  See Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991). 
 110.  See Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2032 (2011) (stating that it is “sometimes beneficial to 
clarify the legal standards governing public officials”).  The Court provided lower courts with discretion in 
determining the order of application of the two prongs because lower courts “are in the best position to 
determine the order of decisionmaking [that] will best facilitate the fair and efficient disposition of each case.”  
Pearson, 555 U.S. at 241–42.  Justice Kagan warned, however, that “[i]n general, courts should think hard, 
and then think hard again, before turning small cases into large ones” by ruling on the merits when a case 
could be quickly dismissed on qualified immunity grounds.  Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2032. 
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A. Courts’ Role in Qualified Immunity 
 
When deciding qualified immunity cases, courts play a particularly significant 
role because the Supreme Court’s guidance provides some flexibility for courts to 
decide constitutional issues when the facts allow or to decline to rule on the merits 
when there is not enough information.  Courts can take one of four approaches 
when confronted with a qualified immunity issue.  These four approaches include: 
(1) cases where the courts find the violation of a clearly established right 
and thus, deny qualified immunity, (2) cases where the courts find no 
constitutional violation and grant qualified immunity, (3) cases where the 
courts invoke their newly found discretion under Pearson to avoid 
reaching the “merits” prong of qualified immunity and grant qualified 
immunity based on the “clearly established law” prong, and (4) cases 
where the courts find a constitutional violation but grant qualified 
immunity because the law was not clearly established at the time.111 
While Pearson alluded to a standard for choosing which approach to take,112 
courts still have a great amount of freedom in this arena.113  While discretionary 
balancing tests are common, this type of methodological discretion is not common, 
especially in a system of government that is based on separation of powers. 
The Pearson Court offered some guidance on the methodology in its 
articulation of the test.  The Court noted that the Saucier sequence—first 
determining whether a constitutional right was violated and then asking whether 
that right was clearly established at the time—would be valuable when ruling with 
respect to “questions that do not frequently arise in cases in which a qualified 
immunity defense is unavailable.”114  For example, in Pearson the Court declined 
to decide the constitutional issue on the merits even though it appears that there 
were good reasons to do so.115  A few months post-Pearson, in Safford Unified 
School District No. 1 v. Redding,116 a plaintiff brought a Fourth Amendment claim 
against school officials who searched her undergarments under the reasonable belief 
that she had brought forbidden prescription drugs into school.117  The Court 
followed the two-step Saucier procedure, articulating the boundaries of officials’ 
 
 111.  Karen M. Blum, Selected Excerpts: Practicing Law Institute’s Twenty-Seventh Annual Section 1983 
Civil Rights Litigation Program: Qualified Immunity: Further Developments in the Post-Pearson Era, 27 
TOURO L. REV 243, 244 (2011) (providing an overview of which approach circuits have taken since Pearson). 
 112.  See supra note 68 and accompanying text; infra notes 114–24 and accompanying text. 
 113.  Beermann argues against allowing “judges to have complete discretion over whether to decide 
unsettled constitutional issues, with no standard governing when the judges should reach the issue, and in 
circumstances in which the decision will not affect the outcome of the case before the court.”  Beermann, 
supra note 63, at 171. 
 114.  Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).  
 115.  The parties had briefed the constitutional issue, the consent-once removed doctrine did not have a 
clear Supreme Court decision at that point, and the issue was relatively “uncomplicated.”  See Beermann, 
supra note 63, at 168. 
 116.  557 U.S. 364 (2009). 
 117.  Id. at 368. 
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duties in this context and finding a constitutional violation, and then determining 
that the right was not clearly established at the time.118  The Court did not, 
however, explain why it reached the constitutional merits rather than simply 
deciding whether the right was clearly established.119  Camreta v. Greene120 
provided some clarification, warning that “[i]n general, courts should think hard, 
and then think hard again, before turning small cases into large ones” by ruling on 
the merits when a case could be quickly dismissed on qualified immunity 
grounds.121 
B. Federal Courts’ Role in Habeas Petitions 
 
The Supreme Court has interpreted AEDPA such that even if a state-court 
decision is clearly erroneous, habeas relief may not be available because the 
decision may still be not objectively unreasonable.122  This standard forces federal 
courts to stay their hand when a state court incorrectly, but reasonably incorrectly, 
applies Supreme Court precedent.  Federal courts, however, have sharply split on 
the fundamental application of the habeas test, creating uniformity issues and 
raising separation of powers concerns.123 
For example, in 2007, Judge Reinhardt, sitting on the Ninth Circuit, dissented 
from a denial to rehear a habeas petition en banc.124  He argued that § 2254(d) was 
unconstitutional on its face in that it violates the separation of powers doctrine.125  
He stated: 
AEDPA’s demand that federal courts disregard the full corpus of 
constitutional jurisprudence—including both the precedents normally 
binding on them through stare decisis and the Constitution itself when 
the state courts got it wrong but their error was not unreasonable—and 
give effect to state court adjudications that, in the federal court’s 
independent determination, violate the Constitution, makes a mockery of 
 
 118.  See id. at 377–78. 
 119.  Most circuits have interpreted Pearson to be “neutral,” in that the caselaw suggests the constitutional 
merits prong to be optional and discretionary, and imparting discretion on lower courts to determine the 
correct methodology on a case-by-case basis.  For an overview of the circuits’ recent jurisprudence in this 
area, see Ted Sampsell-Jones & Jenna Yauch, Official and Municipal Liability for Constitutional and 
International Torts Today: Does the Roberts Court Have an Agenda?: The Repudiation of Saucier v. Katz and 
Its Consequences in the Courts: Measuring Pearson in the Circuits, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 623, 625–27 
(2011) (tracking which methodology courts have used) and Blum, supra note 111, at 243 (2011) (examining 
the legal landscape post-Pearson). 
 120.  131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011). 
 121.  Id. at 2032. 
 122.  See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 376 (2000). 
 123.  For example, Daniel McGrady analyzed the Supreme Court’s decisions from 2000–2011 and found 
that the Court has been divided on the correct standard to apply.  McGrady, supra note 2, at 1602.  He labels 
the conservative Justices the “blind deference camp” and the more liberal Justices the “de novo camp” with 
Justices Kennedy and O’Connor to be something in between.  Id. at 1602, 1618 (“[T]he two groups are 
blatantly using entirely different standards of review.”).  Some judges find AEDPA to be unconstitutional on 
its face.  See infra note 125 and accompanying text. 
 124.  Crater v. Galaza, 508 F.3d 1261, 1262 (9th Cir. 2007) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). 
 125.  Id. 
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the careful boundaries between Congress and the courts that our 
Constitution’s Framers believed so essential to the prevention of 
tyranny.126 
Judge Barkett, sitting on the Eleventh Circuit, argued in her dissent in In re 
Troy Anthony Davis127 that AEDPA was unconstitutional as applied.128  In that 
case, the death row petitioner had admitted to being present during a beating of a 
homeless man, but insisted that one of his companions shot the man.129  Judge 
Barkett argued, “AEDPA cannot possibly be applied when to do so would offend 
the Constitution and the fundamental concept of justice that an innocent man should 
not be executed.”130  In sum, her dissent argued that “[t]his case highlights the 
difficulties in navigating AEDPA’s thicket of procedural brambles,”131 and that 
because the Constitution prohibits executing individuals who are actually innocent, 
habeas relief must be granted to those seeking that relief in this circumstance.132  
She relied in part on Harris v. Nelson,133 a case that recognized that “[t]he very 
nature of the [habeas] writ demands that it be administered with the initiative and 
flexibility essential to insure that miscarriages of justice within its reach are surfaced 
and corrected.”134 
When the case reached the Supreme Court, the divided Court granted the writ 
in seven lines, instructing readers to, “imagine a petitioner in [petitioner’s] situation 
who possesses new evidence conclusively and definitively proving, beyond any 
scintilla of doubt, that he is an innocent man.  The dissent’s reasoning would allow 
such a petitioner to be put to death nonetheless.  The Court correctly refuses to 
endorse such reasoning.”135  In his concurring opinion to that case, Justice Stevens 
stated that “[e]ven if the court finds that § 2254(d) applies in full, it is arguably 
unconstitutional to the extent it bars relief for a death row inmate who has 
established his innocence.”136  In dissent, Justice Scalia adhered strictly to the 
language of AEDPA when he stated that the majority was sending the Southern 
District of Georgia on a “fool’s errand” after petitioner’s evidence has been 
“reviewed and rejected at least three times.”137  He stated further that “[e]ven if the 
District Court were to be persuaded by Davis’s affidavits, it would have no power 
to grant relief.  Federal courts may order the release of convicted state prisoners 
only in accordance with the restrictions imposed by the Antiterrorism and Effective 
 
 126.  Id. at 1270. 
 127.  565 F.3d 810 (11th Cir. 2009). 
 128.  In re Troy Anthony Davis, 565 F.3d 810, 827 (11th Cir. 2009) (Barkett, J., dissenting). 
 129.  Id. at 824 (majority opinion). 
 130.  Id. at 827 (Barkett, J., dissenting). 
 131.  Id. 
 132.  Id. 
 133.  394 U.S. 286 (1969). 
 134.  In re Troy Anthony Davis, 565 F.3d at 828 (Barkett, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (citing Harris 
v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 291 (1969)). 
 135.  In re Troy Anthony Davis, 557 U.S. 952, 954 (2009). 
 136.  Id. at 954 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 137.  Id. at 954, 957–58 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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Death Penalty Act of 1996.”138 
The sharply divided court in In re Troy Anthony Davis illustrates a fundamental 
disagreement about the application of the “reasonable application” prong.  Justice 
Scalia inquired into Supreme Court precedent, which has never provided relief to a 
person who has had a full trial, but later persuades a habeas court that 
circumstances had he is “‘actually’ innocent.”139  Because there was no precedent 
on point, the state court could not have unreasonably applied clearly established 
law.140  Justice Stevens responded to this dissent by lamenting that Justice Scalia 
would treat convincing evidence of innocence the same as a “minor procedural 
error.”141 
Recently, in Lafler v. Cooper,142 the Court was faced with the issue of how to 
apply Strickland’s prejudice test where ineffective assistance of counsel resulted in 
a rejection of a plea offer and a conviction at a later trial.143  In this case, the 
petitioner received a sentence three and one-half times more severe than he would 
have received had he taken the plea.144  The Supreme Court granted the writ 
rejecting the state’s argument that a fair trial should “wipe clean” a claim regarding 
the plea bargain process.145  The Court took a functional approach in finding that 
this argument “ignores the reality that criminal justice today is for the most part a 
system of pleas, not a system of trials.”146  Four Justices in dissent, led by Justice 
Scalia, found that the Sixth Circuit violated AEDPA when it granted habeas relief 
and the Supreme Court did the same when it recognized “a whole new field of 
constitutionalized criminal procedure: plea-bargaining law.”147  Justice Scalia 
mentioned the economic effects of the majority’s opinion, stating, “The ordinary 
criminal process has become too long, too expensive, and unpredictable, in no small 
part as a consequence of an intricate Federal Code of Criminal Procedure imposed 
on the States by this Court in pursuit of perfect justice.”148 
Justice Scalia’s approach in Lafler that emphasizes “federalism, finality, and 
efficiency”149 stands in stark contrast to Judges Reinhardt and Barkett’s more 
flexible and functional approach.150  Congress, with the aid of recent Supreme 
Court jurisprudence, struck a careful balance between the federal courts’ duty to say 
what the law is and the courts’ duty to refrain from interfering with a state court’s 
 
 138.  Id. at 956.  
 139.  Id. at 955. 
 140.  Id.  
 141.  Id. at 954 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 142.  132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012). 
 143.  Id. at 1384. 
 144.  Id. at 1386. 
 145.  Id. at 1381. 
 146.  Id.  
 147.  Id. at 1391 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 148.  Id.  
 149.  See, e.g., Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 650–51 (1993) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“Because 
I am not convinced that the principles governing the exercise of our habeas powers—federalism, finality, and 
fairness— counsel against applying Chapman’s harmless-error standard on collateral review, I would adhere 
to our former practice of applying it to cases on habeas and direct review alike.”). 
 150.  See supra notes 124–34 and accompanying text. 
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final decision.  Despite Congress’s strict articulation of this test, these cases 
illustrate the disagreement that judges hold regarding the congressional purpose and 
application of the AEDPA inquiry.151 
 
C. Stagnation of the Law 
 
With qualified immunity, the current standard provides federal courts with the 
option to define constitutional rights by articulating the law.152  Many scholars have 
argued for a return to the Saucier mandatory two-step approach that asks whether 
the facts alleged show a constitutional violation and whether that constitutional 
right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.  By demanding a 
decision on the merits, this two-step approach would facilitate the constant 
development of constitutional law in light of changing circumstances and novel 
factual situations.153  Through the statute’s requirement of a decision on the merits, 
federal judges promulgate important constitutional standards that “will become the 
basis for a holding that a right is clearly established”154 in later cases.  Professor 
Beermann argues, “[i]n some circumstances, repeated immunity findings can cause 
the law to stagnate.”155  Without deciding the constitutional issue on the merits, 
individual rights are sacrificed because “officials might repeatedly engage in the 
same conduct and successfully defend damages suits with qualified immunity, 
leaving the scope of constitutional rights undetermined.”156  When the scope is 
unclear, a vicious cycle occurs—officials may continually violate individual rights 
without repercussions.  Despite these potential stagnation issues, the mandatory 
Saucier two-step test creates problems of its own.  This approach was met with 
resistance by lower courts and was criticized by scholars as an unnecessary judicial 
 
 151.  For a detailed history of congressional attempts pre-AEDPA, see Larry W. Yackle, Explaining 
Habeas Corpus, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 911 (1985).  For an overview of the legislative history of the Act, see 
McGrady, supra note 2, at 1605–09. 
 152.  See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
 153.  Pfander, supra note 106, at 1607; John C. Jeffries, Jr., Reversing the Order of Battle in 
Constitutional Torts, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 115, 120 (2009) (referring to the system the “degradation of 
constitutional rights”); Adelman & Deitrich, supra note 3, at 87, 96 (discussing the Supreme Court’s duty to 
say what the law is and how a number of doctrines make it more difficult for courts to develop constitutional 
law).  Professor Michael Wells asks “‘will it make it easier for court to decide that the law is unsettled, grant 
qualified immunity and not get to the merits of important constitutional questions . . . .  Now there is always 
an argument against facing them.”  David L. Hudson, Jr., Fourth Amendment Ruling Could Influence First 
Amendment Law, FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER ONLINE (Jan. 27, 2009), available at 
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/4th-amendment-ruling-could-influence-first-amendment-law.  See also 
Gary S. Gildin, Iqbal and Constitutional Torts: The Supreme Court’s Legislative Agenda to Free Government 
from Accountability for Constitutional Deprivations, 114 PENN ST. L. REV 1333 (2010) (arguing that the 
evolution of the Supreme Court’s qualified immunity test and the Twombly and Iqbal standard aligns with the 
Court’s “legislative agenda” to expand the qualified immunity doctrine and discussing how this has negatively 
affected civil rights). 
 154.  Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).  
 155.  Beermann, supra note 63, at 143. 
 156.  See id. at 141.  But see Leong, supra note 106, at 709 (arguing based on empirical studies that 
mandatory sequencing of Saucier does not better serve civil rights plaintiff as a whole because “mandatory 
sequencing does not correspond to any increase in the rate at which courts find for plaintiffs in the qualified 
immunity context”). 
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expenditure.157  In changing the required methodology, the Court afforded lower 
courts much discretion in deciding the constitutional issue as well as the clearly 
established issue.  Discretion, however, may result in other issues, including, 
potentially straining judicial resources, a result the doctrine is supposed to prevent.  
Decisions on the merits may also be labeled “advisory opinions” if unnecessary to 
decide the case at hand.158  Despite these potential issues with the afforded 
discretion, the discretionary approach provides an optimal compromise between the 
competing concerns. 
Switching to the habeas context, federal courts are only required to analyze the 
“clearly established” barrier imposed by § 2254(d)(1).  This inquiry “does not 
require federal courts to determine whether state court decisions are correct or 
incorrect.”159  Some scholars argue that as a result, constitutional issues are not 
addressed and the law stagnates.  This issue is especially prevalent when there is a 
constitutional or federal law issue that has been split amongst the states or circuits.  
In novel circumstances, habeas petitioners may have no recourse to challenge unfair 
jurisdictional procedures because the clearly established inquiry confines relevant 
precedent to the Supreme Court.  In addition, so few habeas petitions actually reach 
the Supreme Court for decisions on the merits that the law is not given the chance 
to develop. 
These limitations have spurred arguments from scholars suggesting a 
mandatory review of lower courts’ analyses.  Taking this approach, courts would 
first ask whether the state court erred in that the conviction involved a violation of 
the petitioner’s constitutional rights, rather than immediately considering whether 
the state court’s ruling was contrary to “clearly established” Supreme Court 
precedent under § 2254(d)(1).160  For example, in Lockyer, the case in which 
petitioner claimed that California’s three-strike law violated his Eighth Amendment 
right, the Court, in its “clearly established” analysis, described the state of Supreme 
Court law in an abstract, vague manner.161  The Court stated that only one relevant 
clearly established law—the gross disproportionality principle—applied to the case 
and the Court admitted that, despite being clearly established, it was “not a model 
of clarity.”162  The gross disproportionality doctrine, a discretionary inquiry, only 
allows reversal in “exceedingly rare” and “extreme case[s].”163  Because the test is 
vague on its face, it serves as a particularly difficult constitutional issue to 
overcome under § 2254(d)(1)’s unreasonable application of federal law inquiry.164  
 
 157.  See Healy, supra note 4, at 902–03; Sam Kamin, An Article III Defense of Merits-First 
Decisionmaking in Civil Rights Litigation: The Continued Viability of Saucier v. Katz, 16 GEO. MASON L. 
REV 53, 59–68 (2008). 
 158.  See infra Part III.D; see also Beermann, supra note 63, at 142. 
 159.  Adelman & Deitrich, supra note 3. 
 160.  Adelman & Deitrich, supra note 3. 
 161.  Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 68 (2003).  See supra notes 96–99 and accompanying text. 
 162.  Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 62, 73 (citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 965 (1991)) (“Thus, in this 
case, the only relevant clearly established law amenable to [the] framework is the gross disproportionality 
principle, the precise contours of which are unclear, applicable only in the ‘exceedingly rare’ and ‘extreme’ 
case.”). 
 163.  Id. at 70. 
 164.  Professor Ides argues that, in this case, in defining the contours of this right, the court relied on dicta.  
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Much like the cycle discussed with qualified immunity,165 when the Court describes 
the law in broad terms, rather than clarifying the bounds of the law, the ambiguity is 
intensified and it becomes increasingly difficult for later courts to grant habeas 
relief in that area of the law.  For example, Professor Ides argues that when the 
Court defined the gross disproportionality principle in this manner, “the Court [may 
have] eschew[ed] its duty to describe the clearly established principles that will 
guide its application of the federal review standards,” resulting in an “abdication,” 
rather than a mere respectful deference to the state court.166 
Likewise, in Wright v. Van Patten,167 an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim, the Supreme Court vaguely described the broad Sixth Amendment right and 
determined that it was unclear what standard applied in the matter.168  In this case, 
the petitioner produced evidence that his lawyer participated in his plea colloquy 
over speaker-phone.169  The district court and the Seventh Circuit disagreed about 
which constitutional test, Strickland v. Washington170 or United States v. Cronic,171 
applied to the case.172  In its opinion, the Court took no position on which test was 
appropriate.173  Because the area of law was ambiguous, the Court found that the 
district court could not have unreasonably applied clearly established federal law.174  
The district court’s decision, therefore, was upheld not because there was no 
precedent, but because it was unclear which precedent applied.  In scenarios like 
these, when the Court does not rule on the merits, the Court, in its discretion, 
determines that the particular case at hand did not afford an appropriate set of facts 
on which to decide the constitutional question.  Much like the qualified immunity 
sequencing issue, this discretion has resulted in a dichotomy among judges.  Some 
judges favor promoting the development of constitutional law and some judges 
follow the principles of constitutional avoidance.175 
 
D. Unnecessary Constitutional Rulings 
 
Since Marbury v. Madison,176 federal courts have understood that it is their 
 
See Ides, supra note 5, at 734, 737 (“It will be rare indeed that a state-court decision will be either contrary to 
or involve an unreasonable application of amorphously described federal law.”). 
 165.  See supra note 158 and accompanying text. 
 166.  Ides, supra note 5, at 747. 
 167.  552 U.S. 120 (2008). 
 168.  Id. at 121. 
 169.  Id. 
 170.  466 U.S. 688 (1984). 
 171.  466 U.S. 648 (1984). 
 172.  Wright, 552 U.S. at 122. 
 173.  Id. 
 174.  Id. 
 175.  For some examples of this dichotomy, see Beermann, supra note 63, at 178–79.  See also David L. 
Hudson, Pearson v. Callahan and Qualified Immunity: Impact on First Amendment Law, 10 FIRST AMEND. L. 
REV. 125, 129 (2011) (“Judges have seized upon enhanced flexibility to grant qualified immunity provided by 
Pearson and impacted numerous areas [constitutional] law.”).  But see Pierre N. Leval, Madison Lecture: 
Judging Under the Constitution: Dicta About Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1249, 1253 n.17 (2006) (arguing that 
judges should be hesitant to resolve complicated constitutional questions). 
 176.  5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
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duty to resolve ambiguities that arise from cases.177  The Court has stated: “We 
ought not to pass on questions of constitutionality . . . unless such adjudication is 
unavoidable.”178  In a law review article in 2006, Judge Leval of the Second Circuit 
outlined the difference between dicta and holding.  He wrote that in crafting a 
holding, courts will state: “A plus B plus C make out a claim (the holding),” 
however courts will often add that “if D were present . . . there would be no 
claim.”179  This “dictum” can be viewed as “narrowing the holding.”180  When a 
similar issue arises in a future case, and D is actually present in that case, the prior 
holding directs one result, when in reality, D might have a more significant effect 
on the case than what the prior court had even “envisioned at the time of the earlier 
opinion.”181  Judge Leval argues that not only is this type of overreaching 
prohibited by the Constitution’s cases and controversies requirement, but it also 
likely produces bad law and increases the judicial branch’s workload.182  According 
to Judge Leval, courts must rule on the merits only when the issue at hand has been 
sufficiently argued on both sides and is ripe for review. 
The adversarial process and incentives to litigate serve as policy justifications 
for the usual practice of avoiding constitutional questions that are unnecessary to 
the resolution of the particular case.  Under the current framework, in qualified 
immunity, a civil rights plaintiff must vigorously argue that the defendant violated 
his or her constitutional rights and those rights were clearly established at the time 
of the alleged violation.  Habeas petitioners, likewise, must prove a constitutional 
violation and show that that violation was clearly established by Supreme Court 
precedent at the time.  Defendants are not required to argue both because they can 
prevail by arguing that the alleged right was not clearly established.  In many cases, 
therefore, only petitioners and plaintiffs have a strong incentive to argue vigorously 
the constitutional issue.183  Even if defendants do argue both, courts still may not be 
properly informed in making their decisions because of limited judicial resources 
and because of a potential bias in knowing the outcome of the case without having 
to resolve the constitutional issue. 
In qualified immunity, the broad discretion afforded to district courts to define 
constitutional rights has the potential to raise dicta issues, because constitutional 
questions should only be decided if their resolution is necessary to resolving the 
particular case before the court.  Judge Leval addressed the Saucier holding directly 
(pre-Pearson), criticizing Saucier as “mischievous,” because before dismissing a 
 
 177.  Id. at 163. 
 178.  Doc v. United States House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 343 (1999) (holding that courts must 
construe statutes to avoid such constitutional questions that are difficult unless construction is plainly contrary 
to the intention of congress); Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 173 
(2001).  For an argument that the Court has more generally embraced unnecessary constitutional rulings, see 
Healy, supra note 4, at 884 (arguing that because of docket discretion, the decline of the political question 
doctrine, the weakening of the mootness doctrine, and an overall less deferential approach taken to 
Congressional acts, that the Court has developed a different view of itself). 
 179.  Leval, supra note 175, at 1253 n.17. 
 180.  Id. 
 181.  Id. 
 182.  Id. at 1255.  
 183.  See Healy, supra note 4, at 913. 
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case on qualified immunity grounds, “the court must first either gratuitously declare 
a new constitutional right in dictum or decide that the claimed right does not 
exist.”184  Likewise, Justice Breyer referred to the period in which Saucier 
controlled as the “failed Saucier experiment”185 and Justice Alito has called it a 
“puzzling misadventure in constitutional dictum.”186  Many scholars agreed.  
Professor Beermann took issue with Saucier’s procedure as “fl[ying] in the face of 
the general norm against dicta and the related, even stronger norm against the 
unnecessary decision of constitutional issues.”187  While many of these concerns 
have been alleviated by the Pearson standard which was articulated in 2009, the 
standard still provides lower courts the discretion to exercise this controversial 
power.  Recently, the Supreme Court declined to address the constitutional question 
in Reichle v. Howards,188 a qualified immunity case.  In this case, the plaintiff 
claimed he had been arrested because of his political speech when he made negative 
remarks about then-Vice President Cheney.189  The Court held that the officials 
were entitled to qualified immunity because, at the time, it was not clearly 
established that a probable cause arrest could create a First Amendment 
violation.190  Justice Thomas authored the opinion, rehashing Pearson’s discretional 
standard and stating that ”[t]his approach comports with our usual reluctance to 
decide constitutional questions unnecessarily.”191 
The Pearson discretionary standard runs the risk of judicial activism, but there 
are sufficient safeguards in place.  In qualified immunity claims and with habeas 
petitions, a court will always know in advance whether its decision on the 
constitutional issue will or will not affect the outcome of that case, and thus, can 
tailor the opinion accordingly.  The court can proceed straight to the clearly 
established analysis to fulfill its duty of resolving the case192 or the court can decide 
that a constitutional ruling is appropriate as well.  In the habeas context, a federal 
court can find that the state court incorrectly interpreted the Constitution, but if the 
decision was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established 
 
 184.  Leval, supra note 175, at 1276 & n.82.  Judge Leval comically discusses a hypothetical conversation 
between a judge and a defendant-official’s attorney under Saucier’s mandatory two-step framework.  Id.  If 
the court recognizes the right to be not sufficiently clearly established, the judge is still required to rule on the 
constitutional issue and he or she must ask the attorneys to brief the issue.  Id.  Defendant-official’s attorney 
might respond, “my client couldn’t care less what you decide on that point.  He has no interest in it.  I can’t 
charge for writing a brief the client has no interest in.  He is entitled to the dismissal no matter what you 
conclude about the theoretical existence of the right.”  Id. at 1278.  Justice Scalia suggested curing this 
potential problem by allowing defendant to petition to the Supreme Court for review of the declaration of a 
right in dictum.  See Bunting v. Mellon, 541 U.S. 1019, 1023, 1025 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Judge 
Leval, however, found it hard to believe that a defendant would appeal after he or she has won.  Leval, supra 
note 175, at 1278.  This precise situation occurred when the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Camreta v. 
Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2032 (2011).  See infra notes 194–208. 
 185.  Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 432 (2007) (Breyer, J. concurring in the judgment and dissenting 
in part).   
 186.  Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 234–35 (2009).  
 187.  Beermann, supra note 63, at 151. 
 188.  132 S. Ct. 2088 (2012). 
 189.  Id. at 2092. 
 190.  Id. at 2097. 
 191.  Id. at 2093. 
 192.  Healy, supra note 4, at 903. 
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federal law, a ruling that the decision was merely incorrect is immaterial.  The 
discretionary standards sufficiently account for the dicta issue so long as courts 
takes into account a number of factors, such as how the set of facts conform to 
precedent, how well the parties have briefed the issue, and whether the issue is 
likely to arise again in the future.  Courts are prone to be sensitive to the potential 
for dicta not only because it is a central concept to the judiciary, but because of 
limited judicial resources.  For example, if a defendant has qualified immunity and 
if the right is not clearly established, then deciding whether the right exists will add 
to the court’s workload, especially if the circumstances of the case are not 
appropriate to decide the issue on the merits.  In the event a court incorrectly 
decides an issue or proclaims an overly broad holding on the merits, future courts 
may distinguish the case.193 
 
E. Petitions by Prevailing Parties 
 
Camreta v. Greene, briefly mentioned above, raises another advisory opinion 
question in its consideration of whether a court of appeals is permitted to rule on an 
official’s petition who has prevailed on qualified immunity grounds, but who 
disagrees with the constitutional determination.194  In this case, a state child 
protective service worker interviewed a nine year-old child about allegations that 
her father sexually abused her.195  The mother sued under § 1983 alleging that the 
interview constituted an unreasonable seizure.196  The district court granted 
summary judgment in favor of the officials because the right to be free from an 
unreasonable search and seizure in this type of circumstance was not clearly 
established at the time.197  Although defendant social worker was granted summary 
judgment, he petitioned for review on the ruling that this conduct violated the 
Constitution.  The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s qualified immunity 
ruling, but also ruled on the merits of the constitutional claim, finding a Fourth 
Amendment violation.198  The court stated that its decision to rule on the merits 
“provide[d] guidance to those charged with the difficult task of protecting child 
welfare within the confines of the [Constitution].”199  On certiorari, the question for 
the Supreme Court was whether his petition violated the rule against petitions by 
prevailing parties.200 
In its holding, the Supreme Court articulated an exception to the prevailing 
party rule, in part, as an attempt to solve the stagnation issues created by the 
discretionary qualified immunity standard.201  The Court declared that the critical 
question under Article III in cases in which petitioner prevailed in the court below 
 
 193.  Courts can use their judgment under the “clearly established” prong to distinguish prior cases. 
 194.  Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2028 (2011). 
 195.  Id. at 2026. 
 196.  Id. at 2027. 
 197.  Id. 
 198.  Id. at 2031 (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 242 (2009)). 
 199.  Id. at 2027. 
 200.  Id. 
 201.  Id. at 2041 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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is “whether the litigant retains the necessary personal stake in the appeal.”202  The 
Court noted that an interest in a ruling can constitute a sufficient personal stake if it 
has a prospective effect on that party.203  In general, because of lacking judicial 
resources, the Court has “declined to consider cases at the request of a prevailing 
party, even when the Constitution allow[s],”204 but in qualified immunity cases, the 
Court held that the nature of the doctrine “supports bending [the] usual rule to 
permit consideration of immunized officials’ petitions.”205 
Some Justices in Camreta, however, characterized the majority’s decision as an 
unconstitutional extension of the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction.206  The dissent in 
this case was unwilling to compromise jurisdictional requirements and conventional 
dictum rules to further the development of constitutional law in qualified immunity 
cases.207  Justice Scalia, although agreeing with the judgment of the majority, noted 
in his concurrence that he might later consider “end[ing] the extraordinary practice 
of ruling upon constitutional questions unnecessarily when the defendant possesses 
qualified immunity.”208 
Shifting to the habeas context, in a pre-AEDPA case, Teague v. Lane,209 Justice 
O’Connor directly addressed the dictum issues the habeas doctrine raises.  In her 
plurality opinion, the threshold issue was whether the claim relied on a “new rule” 
of criminal procedure.210  If so, the Court should dismiss without considering the 
merits of the asserted rule “because a habeas petition may not be granted on the 
basis of a new rule, any opinion expressed by the court on the merits of the rule 
would be merely advisory.”211  According to Teague, therefore, when a petitioner 
seeks habeas relief on a new principle of criminal law, lower courts are instructed to 
dismiss that petition without hearing the claim on the merits. 
 
F. Alternatives to the Current Approach 
 
While this Note has argued thus far that the current frameworks for the 
qualified immunity and habeas corpus doctrines serve to promote effectively 
judicial economy, federalism, and separation of powers principles, others find the 
scope of doctrines to be too narrow to protect constitutional rights.212  For habeas 
petitioners and for civil rights plaintiffs, the qualified immunity and habeas 
standards act as a barrier to relief, shielding government officials from the 
 
 202.  Id. at 2028 (majority opinion) (citing Deposit Guaranty Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 332–336 
(1980)). 
 203.  Id. at 2029. 
 204.  Id. at 2030 (citations omitted). 
 205.  Id. 
 206.  Id. at 2042 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 207.  Id. 
 208.  Id. at 2036 (Scalia, J., concurring).  See also Country of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 859 
(1998) (Stevens, J. concurring) (stating that when a “question is both difficult and unresolved, I believe it 
wiser to adhere to the policy of avoiding the unnecessary adjudication of constitutional questions”). 
 209.  Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (plurality opinion). 
 210.  Id. at 299–301.  
 211.  Id.; Healy, supra note 4, at 884. 
 212.  See John H. Blume, AEDPA: The “Hype” and the “Bite”, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 259, 297 (2006). 
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consequences of their unconstitutional acts or decisions.  A recent New York Times 
article notes that judges, “some of whom have ruled in favor of the death penalty 
many times, have complained that Congress and the Supreme Court have raised 
daunting barriers for petitioners to appeal their convictions.”213  Eric Freedman 
notes that there is increasing frustration amongst judges and that they have become 
less likely to adhere to “legalistic mumbo-jumbo . . . which prevents them from 
reaching fair results.”214 
Scholars have attempted to articulate reasonable alternative standards.215  For 
death row inmates, Daniel McGrady argues for congressional revision of AEDPA 
such that a different habeas standard applies.216  In capital cases, courts would 
review federal law claims de novo.217  Professor Beermann argues that Pearson’s 
new methodology is “deeply problematic” because it provides lower courts with an 
unreviewable discretion.218  He proposes a set of guidelines to replace the two-step 
approach.219  He also contends that there should be a presumption in favor of 
deciding cases on the merits.220 
Professor Pfander proposes a new doctrine, to be judicially-developed, that 
would encourage civil rights plaintiffs who cannot satisfy the qualified immunity 
standard to sue for nominal damages.221  In order to state a  claim, plaintiffs would 
need to disclose in the complaint the fact that he or she is only seeking nominal 
damages, rather than compensatory and punitive damages and litigation costs and 
attorney’s fees.222  Pfander compares this type of litigation to declaratory and 
injunctive types of relief and argues that this doctrine would encourage the 
initiation of more suits against low-level officials, but would not increase the level 
of frivolous suits.223  He cites the Court’s recent decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal224 
which requires a more developed factual record at the pleading stage, as a barrier 
 
 213.  John Schwartz, Judges’ Dissents For Death Row Inmates Are Rising, N.Y. TIMES, (August 13, 
2009), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/14/us/14dissent. html?_r=2&; (citing Judge Reinhardt’s 
dissent that found the act to have made “a mockery of the careful boundaries between Congress and the courts 
that our Constitution’s framers believed so essential to the prevention of tyranny”). 
 214.  Id. 
 215.  See Ides, supra note 5, at 680 (discussing the development of § 2254(d)(1) that has left us “with a 
mix of light and fog,” and attempting to find a “workable way of applying [the statute] in a fashion that 
comports with text and precedent”); see also Leong, supra note 106, at 709 (“[T]he decision to decide the 
constitutional question should result from the thoughtful assessment of two relevant factors: whether the 
constitutional issue is likely to be repeated without ever becoming more susceptible to review and whether the 
issue is adequately presented in the particular case, taking account of the procedural posture of the case, the 
corresponding thoroughness of the parties’ briefing of the constitutional issue, and the level of factual 
development.”). 
 216.  See McGrady, supra note 2. 
 217.  Id. 
 218.  Beermann, supra note 63. 
 219.  Id. 
 220.  Beermann argues that “[a]t a minimum, courts should be required to give reasons for not [reaching 
the merits of the constitutional issue].”  Id. at 161. 
 221.  Pfander, supra note 106, at 1607, 1639 (suggesting nominal damages suits as a way for plaintiffs “to 
secure an adjudication of constitutional claims in a world of legal novelty or uncertainty”).  
 222.  Id. at 1619. 
 223.  Id. at 1636. 
 224.  556 U.S. 262 (2009). 
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for those meritless claims.225  With this approach, the court could reach a decision 
on the merits and giv[e] content to constitutional law”226 in murkier cases where the 
law is not clearly established enough to satisfy the qualified immunity threshold.227  
The difficulty with his proposal, however, is the judicial resources issue addressed 
above.228  Courts may be unwilling to reach the merits on a complex issue when the 
plaintiff is only requesting one dollar.  In addition, seeking constitutional 
“clarification” is not cheap, and there are not a lot of incentives to bring these 
claims, especially for pro se plaintiffs. 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
Since Marbury v. Madison, the judiciary has been understood as the branch 
responsible for interpreting the Constitution.  Through their adjudication in the 
qualified immunity and habeas corpus contexts, courts play a crucial role in the 
development of constitutional rights.  Both doctrines serve as barriers for plaintiffs 
and state prisoners to vindicating their constitutional rights, as well as shields for 
government officials who violate those constitutional rights.  The Court’s decision 
in Pearson provided courts with discretion to decide whether to define 
constitutional rights, and likewise, AEDPA has limited federal courts’ review of 
state court judgments to those that have violated clearly established Supreme Court 
law.  While these doctrines, in a sense, impede the development of constitutional 
law, they serve judicial economy purposes and help to preserve federalism and 
separation of powers principles.  The discretion results in a necessary ongoing 
tension between state and federal courts and between the executive branch and the 
judicial branch.  In some cases, deciding constitutional questions is necessary to 
fulfilling the court’s duty to resolve cases presented to it, but, deciding 
constitutional questions in dicta can result in serious consequences. 
The discretion that both doctrines afford courts allows them to tailor their 
methodology to the case at hand.  While this approach runs the risk of judicial 
activism and resulting dicta, there are sufficient safeguards in place.  Courts are 
unlikely to pronounce overly broad rulings because of the lack of judicial resources.  
In addition, when courts choose to unnecessarily decide the issue on the merits, the 
holding can usually be distinguished in later cases.229  If not, admittedly, 
overreaching can result in severe side effects on future cases.230  These effects, 
however, are inherent to the judicial system and are the unavoidable results of a 
dual system of government.231 
 
 225.  Id.  
 226.  Pfander, supra note 106, at 1608. 
 227.  Id. at 1607. 
 228.  See supra notes 193–194 and accompanying text. 
 229.  In qualified immunity, in later cases, courts can distinguish precedent using the clearly established 
prong.  In habeas, federal courts are confined to Supreme Court analysis, which serves as one uniform body of 
law to consider.    
 230.  See Healy, supra note 4, at 935. 
 231.  Id. at 903, 917 (“[T]o a certain extent, the announcement of legal principles broader than necessary 
to decide a case is an inherent aspect of our legal system.”).  Usually courts do not merely repeat facts of the 
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The current Supreme Court standards in the qualified immunity and habeas 
corpus doctrines best resolve the aforementioned issues of dicta and stagnation by 
maintaining an ongoing tension.  When deciding which prong of either doctrine to 
decide first, courts must consider on a case-by-case basis the particular facts of the 
case at hand, potential stagnation and dicta issues, and judicial resources.  The 
qualified immunity and habeas frameworks respect courts’ duties to interpret the 
law, while conforming to the doctrines’ goals of fairness, finality, federalism, and 
the prevention of frivolous claims. 
 
 
case and announce a simple, straightforward judgment; their decisions will almost always resolve another case 
that is not before the court. 
